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COMMENTS

DUI ROADBLOCKS: DRUNK DRIVERS TAKE A
TOLL ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Drunk driving is a problem of immense proportions.' Consequently, public pressure has been mounting on law enforcement
agencies to crack down on the drunk driver.2 Congress and most
state legislatures have responded by enacting legislation providing
much harsher driving under the influence (DUI) penalties. 3 Simulta1. In the decade prior to 1982 over 250,000 people were killed in alcohol related
accidents in America. State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d
992, 999 (1983) (Feldman, J., specially concurring) (citing Federal Legislation to
Combat Drunk Driving Including National Driver Register: Hearing On S.671,
S.672, S.2158 Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transportation of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce Science & Transportation,97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 65 (1982)). Moreover,
in 1980, over 650,000 people were injured in alcohol related accidents. Id. Between
55-65% of the drivers killed in single-vehicle accidents have blood alcohol content
(BAC) levels above the legal limit. Ekstrom, 663 P.2d at 999, (Feldman, J., specially
concurring) (citing Alcohol, Drugs & Driving: Hearing to Examine What Effect Alcohol & Drugs Have on Individuals While Driving Before the Subcomm. on Alcoholism
& Drug Abuse of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, 97th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 1 (1982)).
2. Recent years have seen the emergence of very powerful political lobbying
groups committed to eliminating drunk driving. See generally Driving Drunks Off
the Road, Changing Times, July 1982, at 50, 50-52 (discussion of anti-drunk driving
lobbying groups). These groups include, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD),
Students Against Drunk Driving (SADD) and Remove Intoxicated Drivers (RID). Id.
3. See 233 U.S.C. § 408 (1982), where Congress has conditioned highway and
transportation grants to the states on the states passing strict DUI laws. For example,
subsection (3)(e)(1) provides:
For purposes of this section, a State is eligible for a basic grant if such state
provides - (A) for prompt suspension, for a period not less than ninety days
in the case of a first offender and not less than one year in the case of any
repeat offender, of the driver's license of any individual who a law enforcement
officer has probable cause under State law to believe has committed [sic] an
alcohol-related traffic offense, and (i) to whom is administered one or more
chemical tests to determine whether the individual was intoxicated while operating the motor vehicle and who is determined, as a result of such tests, to be
intoxicated, or (ii) who refuses to submit to such a test as proposed by the
officer; (B) for a mandatory sentence, which shall not be subject to suspension
or probation, of (i) imprisonment for not less than forty-eight consecutive
hours, or (ii) not less than ten days of community service, of any person convicted of driving while intoxicated more than once in any five-year period; (C)
that any person with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 or greater when
driving a motor vehicle shall be deemed to be driving while intoxicated; and
(D) for increased efforts or resources dedicated to the enforcement of alcohol
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neously, state and local law enforcement agencies have developed
and are employing DUI roadblocks in response to the increased public pressure.'
The imposition of roadblocks to investigate DUI, however, implicates the very core of the fourth amendment 5 because literally
thousands of drivers are subject to seizure6 without probable cause
or any individualized suspicion.7 In effect all motorists approaching
a DUI roadblock are presumed drunk until they prove otherwise.

Supporters of DUI roadblocks seek to justify the suspicionless
seizure of drivers because drunk driving is such a tremendous national problem.' Although the severity of the problem cannot be
questioned, narcotics, theft, and violent crimes also pose serious national problems.9 If suspicionless seizures of persons at DUI roadrelated traffic laws and increased efforts to inform the public of such
enforcement.
Id. States have enacted legislation to comply with the above requirements. See, e.g.,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2 par. 11-501 (1985) (state statute conforms to minimum requirements of federal law).
4. An indication of the recent popularity of DUI roadblocks is that the overwhelming majority of cases contesting the constitutionality of the roadblocks have
taken place in the last four to five years. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice
Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983); Jones v. State, 459 So.2d 1068 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984); State v. Kirk, 202 N.J.
Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1275 (1985).
5. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath of affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST.

6.

amend. IV.

In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the United States Supreme Court
held that "stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute[s] a
'seizure' within the meaning of [the fourth amendment] even though the purpose of
the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Id. at 653. Accord United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976) (roadblock stop constitutes a
seizure).
7. See Jones v. State, 459 So.2d 1068, 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) aff'd, No.
66, 373 (Fla. Feb. 20, 1986) (available Mar. 24, 1986, on LEXIS, States library, Fla.
file). In Jones the district court stated that because all motorists are stopped at DUI
roadblocks regardless of any level of suspicion the vast majority of those stopped are
not driving under the influence. Id. The Court then provided:
The question has frightening implications. The thought that an American can
be compelled to 'show his papers' before exercising his right to walk the
streets, drive the highways or board the trains is repugnant to American institutions and ideals . . . . It might be argued that if the law did permit such
stops, we would have less crime. Nevertheless, our system is based on the idea
that the risk of criminal activity is less of a danger than the risk of unfettered
interference with personal liberty.
Id. (quoting Ekstrom, 663 P.2d at 997 (Feldman, J., specially concurring)).
8. See supra note 1 for information concerning the extent of the drunk driving
problem. See also infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
9. For example, in 1983, in cities with populations of 250,000 persons or more,
there were 1,294 violent crimes for every 100,000 persons. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CaN-
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blocks are constitutional, then, under like reasoning, suspicionless
non-arbitrary searches and seizures to uncover evidence of narcotics
possession or burglary would also be constitutional.10 The suspicionless seizure of persons creates grave constitutional implications.
Unfortunately, a substantial majority of the courts that have examined DUI roadblocks have not carefully analyzed the constitutionality of the roadblocks.'"
Generally, the courts have focused on the procedural features of
the particular roadblock in question rather than how the roadblocks
implicate the person's right to privacy.' 2 For example, courts have
considered who determined the location of the roadblock, whether
objective criteria were used in deciding which cars to stop and
whether adequate lighting and safety precautions existed. 3 Although procedural safeguards are very important and should not be
minimized, the courts have overemphasized the procedural aspects
of DUI roadblocks and have not adequately examined their substantive constitutional validity."' This comment will first examine the
constitutionality of DUI roadblocks under the general fourth
1985 168 (105th ed. 1984).
10. Ekstrom, 663 P.2d at 997 (Feldman, J., specially concurring). If suspicionless seizures of persons can be maintained to investigate DUI, then presumably
similar stops of all persons could be maintained to investigate other crimes. See also
infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
11. The majority of courts that have considered the constitutionality of DUI
roadblocks have concentrated on features which limit the discretion of the officers
that work the roadblocks and features that promote the safety of the stops. See, e.g.,
Jones v. State, 459 So.2d 1068, 1078-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (struck down roadblock because it did not have the necessary objective criteria) aff'd No. 66, 373 (Fla.
Feb. 20, 1986) (available Mar. 24, 1986, on LEXIS, States library, Fla. file); State v.
Hilleshiem, 291 N.W.2d 314, 318-19 (Iowa 1980) (struck down roadblock which did
not match criteria); State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143 (Me. 1985) (upholding a roadblock
because objective criteria were satisfied); People v. Peil, 122 Misc. 2d 617, 471 N.Y.S.
2d 532, 534 (Crim. Ct. 1984) (upholding roadblock because necessary elements were
present). Compare Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 483 N.E.2d 1102 (1985)
(Supreme Court of Massachusetts upholds a roadblock because it was conducted pursuant to specific guidelines) with Commonwealth v. McGeoghan, 389 Mass. 137, 449
N.E.2d 349 (1983) (Supreme Court of Massachusetts struck down roadblock because
not carried out pursuant to specific guidelines).
12. See supra note 11.
13. See, e.g., People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 288-92, 486 N.E.2d 880, 887-89
(1985) (supervisory personnel selected roadblock site, vehicles stopped in preestablished fashion, and guidelines in conducting roadblock existed); Peil, 122 Misc. 2d
617, 471 N.Y.S. 2d at 534 (stop was not arbitrary, it was made pursuant to a plan
supervisors devised).
14. Only the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma has ruled that the suspicionless seizure of motorists at DUI roadblocks is per se violative of the fourth
amendment. State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984). The Smith court
held that such suspicionless seizures "draw dangerously close to what may be referred
to as a police state." Id. at 564. The Smith court recognized that the wholesale suspicionless seizure of thousands of innocent people to investigate DUI is fundamentally
repugnant to the constitution no matter that police discretion may be somewhat circumscribed. Id. at 564-65.
SUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
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amendment reasonableness test that the United States Supreme
Court is increasingly employing to replace its "conventional" fourth
amendment analysis.' 5 Next, this comment will analyze two major
exceptions to the general individualized suspicion requirement.' 6 Finally, this comment will examine the root of much confusion concerning DUI roadblocks; the undue weight that courts have given
dictum from a relevant Supreme Court decision. 17 This comment
concludes that because there exist methods to advance the public
interest without the wholesale seizure of thousands of motorists,
DUI roadblocks unduly interfere with the traveling public's right
under the fourth amendment to be free from unreasonable seizure.' 8
I.

DUI

ROADBLOCKS UNDER THE REASONABLENESS TEST

Long before the Supreme Court started to employ the reasonableness balancing test in fourth amendment jurisprudence, it employed "conventional" fourth amendment analysis.' 9 Under conventional fourth amendment jurisprudence, searches and seizures
occurring without a warrant or probable cause were presumed unreasonable and were, therefore, unconstitutional."0 This is because
the reasonableness of a search or seizure, depends in part on the
2'
specific commands of the fourth amendment's warrant clause.22
drawn
There are, however, a few "jealously guarded and carefully
exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements. 3 These
15. See infra notes 19-101 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 102-49 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 150-61 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 161-63 and.accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text (discussion of conventional
view of fourth amendment).
20. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1971).
See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 731, 744-46 (Powell, J., concurring). See generally
Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CalM. L.
REV. 601 (1982) (thorough analysis of warrant and probable cause requirement of the
fourth amendment and historical reasons for it); Wasserstrom, The Incredible
Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CalM. L. REV. 257, 281-320 (1984) (excellent
discussion of the competing interpretations of the fourth amendment and reasons
therefor).
21. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 297. This view, which has been
described as the "conventional view," has been accepted by the Supreme Court in the
majority of the fourth amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Collidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) where the Court stated that "searches conducted
...without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the fourth amendment, subject to only a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions." (emphasis added) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967)). See generally Wasserstrom, supra note 20 at 282-83 (excellent discussion of
fourth amendment's warrant requirement).
22. Collidge, 403 U.S. at 455 (quoting Jones v. United States, 375 U.S. 493, 494
(1958)).
23. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court created a very limited exception to the probable cause requirement. The Court noted that when an
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include, for example, Terry-type stop and frisk searches, 24 and
searches and seizures occurring when individuals cross the border
into the United States.2" DUI roadblocks, however, do not fall
within any recognized exception to the warrant and probable cause
requirement, and drivers are routinely seized at DUI roadblocks
without a warrant or probable cause. Under the conventional fourth
amendment analysis, therefore, DUI roadblocks would violate the
fourth amendment.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has recently moved
away from this conventional analysis. The trend instead has been to
employ a balancing test in order to examine the "reasonableness" of
a search or seizure.26 The Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of DUI roadblocks but it would likely examine them
under the balancing test, because the Court has expressly held that
the balancing test applies to all seizures which fall short of tradi27
tional arrests.
In this context, reasonableness depends on a balance between
the public interest in highway safety and the individual's right to
personal security and privacy.28 Several factors must be weighed in
"officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is
investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous" it would be unreasonable to require the officer to procure a search warrant. Id. at 24. The Terry Court
stated that "the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts
which taken together with rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant
that intrusion." Id. at 21.
Another exception is the border search exception created in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) and expanded in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266 (1972) and United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977). The rationale
behind the exception is historical, and is based on the unique circumstances which
occur at the border. Boyd, at 623. These include the government's interest in maintaining the integrity of the border and the government's national self-protection interests coupled with the individual's lower expectation of privacy at the border. See
generally United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3309-10 (1985)
(border search not subject to usual fourth amendment restraints); Ramsey, 431 U.S.
at 617 (same). Other exceptions include administrative searches, Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (for discussion of Camara see infra notes 107-22 and accompanying text) and document inspections aboard seagoing vessels, United States v.
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
24. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See also supra note 23 (brief discussion of
Terry).
25. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985). See
also supra note 23 for brief discussion of border searches.
26. See, e.g., Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985); United States v.
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
See generally Wasserstrom, supra note 20, at 309 (asserting that Justices Rehnquist,
Burger, and O'Connor would likely be willing to test all types of police intrusions
against the test of general reasonableness).
27. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979) (seizures which are
"substantially less intrusive than arrests"). See also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50
(1979) (brief detention short of traditional arrest); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (brief stop
and frisk short of arrest).
28. Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51. See also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,
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the balance. First, the court must consider the "gravity" of the public interest that the seizure seeks to serve.2 9 Second, the court must
consider the extent to which the seizure advances that public interest. 0 Finally, the court must consider the severity of the interference with the individual's liberty and privacy.31 Once these factors
are considered, the burden falls upon the state to show that a particular seizure is reasonable."8
The Supreme Court has decided several cases that provide
guidance in analyzing DUI roadblocks under the balancing test."3
4
For example, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,"
the Court held
that a roving border patrol's suspicionless stop of a vehicle in the
vicinity of the Mexican border was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional under the fourth amendment.-" The Court recognized
a legitimate public interest in stemming the flow of illegal aliens, but
concluded that to sanction such suspicionless random stops of all
vehicles would subject thousands of legitimate travelers to unlimited
police interference.8 " The Court ruled that some quantum of indi109 (1977).
29. Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51.
30. Id. at 51.
31. Id. The Brown Court went on to state that in weighing these factors concern
must be taken so that "an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field."
Id. at 51.
32. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-61 (1979). The Prouse Court required empirical data from the state showing that the intrusion sought to be justified
was effective and reasonable. Id. at 659. Accord Koonce v. State, 651 S.W.2d 46, 46-48
(Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (burden is on the state to show facts authorizing warrantless
seizure).
33. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (Supreme Court uses balancing test in holding a suspicionless random stop of vehicle for driver's license check
unconstitutional); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (Court uses
balancing test in upholding suspicionless stops at a permanent immigration checkpoint near the Mexican border); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)
(Court uses balancing test in holding a suspicionless random seizure of vehicle for
immigration check unconstitutional). See also United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 413
U.S. 266 (1973). Almeida-Sanchez concerned a random stop of a vehicle near the
Mexican border by the border patrol to search the vehicle. The Court used the balancing analysis and concluded that the search violated the fourth amendment. Id. at
273. Because Almeida-Sanchez was a search case rather than a seizure case it is not
as useful for analyzing DUI roadblocks. For a discussion of Brignoni-Ponce,Martinez-Fuerte, and Prouse, see infra notes 34-59 and accompanying text.
34. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
35. Id. at 886-87. The Brignoni-Ponce Court required a "reasonable suspicion"
to justify random roving-patrol stops. Id. at 882. The officers possessed no suspicion,
therefore, the stop was not justified and violated the fourth amendment.
36. Id. at 882. The Court stated:
To approve roving-patrol stops of all vehicles in the border area, without any
suspicion that a particular vehicle is carrying illegal immigrants, would subject
the residents of these and other areas to potentially unlimited interference
with their use of the highways, solely at the discretion of border patrol officers.
Id. Cf. Jones v. State, 459 So.2d 1068, 1071 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (the vast majority of motorists stopped at DUI roadblocks are not under the influence of alcohol).
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vidualized suspicion was required to justify a roving border patrol
stop of a vehicle."'
Two years later in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte38 the
Court confronted a fourth amendment challenge to a permanent immigration checkpoint.39 Using the balancing test, the Court recognized the same legitimate public purpose as in Brignoni-Ponce.°
Martinez-Fuerte was different, however, because stops at a permanent checkpoint were less intrusive than the roving patrol stops in
Brignoni-Ponce."' The Martinez-Fuerte Court explained that while
the "objective intrusion""2 of the checkpoint stop was the same as in
a roving patrol stop, the "subjective intrusion" ' of the checkpoint
stop was not as great."' According to the Court, drivers stopped at a
permanent checkpoint would not be as apprehensive or fearful
about being stopped because it would not be any surprise to be
stopped because the checkpoint location would be widely known.'
Moreover, officers manning a permanent immigration checkpoint
possessed less discretion than roving border patrol officers because
at the permanent checkpoint officers could not subjectively determine which cars to stop."' The Martinez-Fuerte Court concluded
that the balance of interests weighed heavily in the government's
47
favor and held that the suspicionless stops were reasonable.
37. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886-87. See also supra note 35 (discussing the
required level of suspicion).
38. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
39. Id. at 545.
40. Id. at 551-52. The public purpose was to prevent the illegal entry of undocumented aliens. Id.
41. Id. at 558-59.
42. Id. at 558. The Martinez-Fuerte Court defined "objective intrusion" as the
stop itself, the questioning and the visual inspection which takes place at the checkpoint. Id.
43. Id. The Court explained that "subjective intrusion" was "the generating of
concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers." Id.
44. Id. In Martinez-Fuerte the Court concluded that the subjective intrusion of
the immigration checkpoint was "appreciably less" than the subjective intrusion in
Brignoni-Ponce. Id.
45. Id. at 559. The Court stated that, "[miotorists using these highways are not
taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowiedge of, the location of the
checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere." Id. Cf. People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d
273, 291, 486 N.E.2d 880, 888 (1985) (advance publicity of police intentions to conduct DUI roadblocks lessens the subjective intrusion because motorists would be less
likely to be surprised); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174, 1182 (1983)
(advance warning signs on the highway and publicity in the media would lessen the
subjective intrusion).
46. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559. Because all cars passing through the
checkpoint were stopped the officers at the checkpoint had less discretion than roving
patrols. Id. Moreover, for the same reasons there was less room for harassing and
abusive stops at the permanent checkpoint. Id.
47. Id. at 562. The Martinez-Fuerte Court went on to limit the extent of its
holding by stating that, "our holding today is limited to the type of stops described in
this opinion. Any further detention . . . must be based on consent or probable
cause." Id. at 567 (quoting Brignoni-Ponce,422 U.S. at 882).
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In 1979, the Court decided Delaware v. Prouse.' In Prouse, a
local police officer randomly stopped a vehicle to check the driver's
license and the vehicle registration.' The officer conceded that he
did not have any individualized suspicion as to the driver or the vehicle."0 The Court initially recognized that a stop of a vehicle is a
"seizure" for fourth amendment purposes regardless of its purpose
or duration.5 1 The Court then noted that the state had a legitimate
interest in ensuring that the drivers on its highways were qualified
and that their vehicles were maintained in safe operating condition." The Prouse Court concluded, however, that random stops,
unsupported by individualized suspicion were too intrusive and did
not adequately serve the public interest.53 The Court stated that,
stopping vehicles upon observed violations would be a more effective
and less intrusive alternative to such suspicionless stops.5 4 The
Court therefore held that a random stop of the vehicle and seizure
of its occupants, regardless of brevity, without an articulable and
individualized suspicion that a vehicle or its driver is in violation of
law, violated the fourth amendment."
These cases show that when a vehicle is stopped and its occupants are seized, the fourth amendment requires an articulable and
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing unless the stop involves no
element of surprise,50 the stop is made for an administrative purpose,"' and the stop involves limited police discretion." At DUI
48. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
49. Id. at 650.
50. Id. at 650-51. The officer stated that the stop was "routine" and that "I saw
the car in the area and wasn't answering any complaints, so I decided to pull them

off." Id.
51. Id. at 653. See also Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 556-58; Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. at 878.
52. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658.
53. Id. at 659.
54. Id. The Prouse Court stated:
The foremost method of enforcing traffic and vehicle safety regulations, it
must be recalled, is acting upon observed violations. Vehicle stops for traffic
violations occur countless times each day; and on these occasions, licenses and
registration papers are subject to inspection and drivers without them will be
ascertained. Furthermore, drivers without licenses are presumably the less safe
drivers whose propensities may well exhibit themselves. Absent some empirical
data to the contrary, it must be assumed that finding an unlicensed driver
among those who commit traffic violations is a much more likely event than
finding an unlicensed driver by choosing randomly from the entire universe of
drivers.
Id.
55. Id. at 663.
56. Cf. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 559 (motorists not taken by surprise because checkpoint is permanent and its location widely known).
57. See infra notes 107-22 and accompanying text (comparing DUI roadblocks
to administrative searches). See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
(Court creates administrative search exception).
58. Cf. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 559 (police have little discretion because
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roadblocks, however, approaching motorists are surprised, are not
examined for an administrative purpose but for evidence of criminal
activity, and substantial discretion remains with the police.5 Therefore, under the teaching of these cases the constitutionality of DUI
roadblocks is extremely suspect. Moreover, upon weighing the three
factors that the Court's balancing test mandates, the unconstitution-

ality of DUI roadblocks becomes clear.
A.

The "Gravity" of the Public Interest

In applying the balancing test in the context of DUI roadblocks,
the first factor to consider is the gravity of the public purpose the
seizure seeks to serve.60 It is beyond dispute that the state has a
legitimate public interest in preventing the deaths and injuries that
drunk drivers cause.6" The Supreme Court has recognized these legitimate concerns on numerous occasions. 62 Nevertheless, a legitimate public interest concerning a problem of great magnitude is,
without more, insufficient to justify wholesale intrusions into people's privacy. For such intrusions to be justified, the intrusions must
also advance the public interest in an effective manner.6 8
B. DUI Roadblocks' Effectiveness in Advancing the Public
Interest
DUI roadblocks have been described as "woefully deficient" in
their effectiveness at apprehending drunk drivers." The available
data indicate that DUI roadblocks are grossly ineffective at uncovering persons who are driving under the influence." The Supreme
Court recognized that the roving suspicionless stops in Prouse6s and
all cars passing through checkpoint are stopped).
59. See infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
60. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
61. Cf. State v. Superior Ct. In & For County of Pima, 143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d
1073, 1076 (1985) (preventing drunk driving is a legitimate public interest which
clearly weighs in favor of the state); State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1136 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1984) (Indiana's interest in keeping drunk drivers off the road is compelling); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 536, 673 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1983) (problem of
drunk driving is one of enormous magnitude). See also supra note 1.
62. In South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558 (1983), for example, the Court
stated that "the situation underlying this case - that of the drunk driver - occurs
with tragic frequency on our nation's highways. The carnage caused by drunk drivers
is well documented and needs no detailed recitation here." Id. In Perez v. Campbell,
402 U.S. 637, 672 (1971), Justice Blackmun noted that, "the slaughter on the highways of this nation exceeds the death toll of all our wars") (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted).
63. Brown, 443 U.S. at 50.
64. Comment, Sobriety Checkpoint Roadblocks: Constitutional In Light of
Delaware v. Prouse?, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 813, 833 (1984).
65. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
66. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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Brignoni-Ponce 7 did not advance the public interests asserted
therein sufficiently to justify such seizures of vehicles without individualized suspicion. This same analysis, applied to suspicionless
seizures at DUI roadblocks proves the roadblocks unconstitutional,
because they likewise do not sufficiently advance the public interest
in apprehending drunk drivers."' In State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice
Court,"' for example, the Arizona Supreme Court noted that out of
5,763 vehicles stopped at a DUI roadblock, only 14 DUI arrests were
made. " Also, at DUI roadblocks in Maryland, over 6,000 cars were
detained, resulting in only 31 DUI arrests.

7

DUI roadblocks have

simply not been efficient and effective at apprehending drunk
drivers.
The Prouse Court concluded that rather than suspicionless
stops, stopping vehicles upon observed traffic violations would be a
more effective and appropriate way to apprehend motorists who are
operating with invalid driver's licenses." It cannot seriously be argued that motorists without valid driver's licenses are more readily
observed violating traffic laws than are drunk drivers. Drunk drivers
display readily observable signs of intoxication.7 3 Thus, under the
reasoning of the Prouse Court it is manifest that requiring police to
act only upon observed traffic violations would be a more efficient
67. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
68.

See infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.

69. 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983).
70. Id. at 993.
71. See Comment, supra note 64 at 813 n.1.
72. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979). See supra note 54 (precise language the
Court used).

73. The California Highway Patrol compiled a list of characteristics which indicated that a driver may be intoxicated. Those characteristics include:
1. Unreasonable speed (high).
2. Driving in spurts (slow, then fast, then slow).
3. Frequent lane changing with excessive speed.
4. Improper passing with insufficient clearance; also taking too long or
swerving too much in overtaking and passing, e.g., overcontrol.
5. Overshooting or disregarding traffic control signals.
6. Approaching signals unreasonably fast or slow, and stopping or attempting to stop with uneven motion.
7. Driving at night without lights. Delay in turning lights on when starting from a parked position.
8. Failure to dim lights to oncoming traffic.
9. Driving in lower gears without apparent reason, or repeatedly clashing
gears.
10. Jerky starting or stopping.
11. Driving unreasonably slow.
12. Driving too close to shoulders or curbs, or appearing to hug the edge
of the road or continually straddling the center line.
13. Driving with windows down in cold weather.
14. Driving or riding with head partly or completely out of the window.
Ross, Law, Science and Accidents: The British Road Safety Act of 1967, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 11 (1973). See also State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1137 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984) (police officer well trained to identify drunk driving indicators).
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and much less constitutionally offensive method of apprehending
74
drunk drivers.
Advocates of DUI roadblocks assert, however, that while the
roadblocks may be inefficient at detecting drunk drivers, the deterrent effect of DUI roadblocks is enough to justify them.7 5 Their argument is that the high visibility of DUI roadblocks causes the perception of a concentrated police presence, and thereby deters drunk
driving. The available studies on the deterrent effect of DUI roadblocks, however, are at best inconclusive and tend to show that the
roadblocks are not a useful deterrence tool.78 One study has shown
that increasing the probability of arrest and creating harsher DUI
penalties has not succeeded in deterring drunk drivers.77 When the
roadblocks are installed there may be a short term decrease in
drunk driving, but the previous drunk driving levels rapidly reappear.78 This pattern may exist because those who habitually drive
drunk are not deterrable. These people usually have serious social
and alcohol related problems and are unable to control their drinking.79 As a result, the deterrent effect of DUI roadblocks is overestimated. There is simply no evidence showing that DUI roadblocks
sufficiently deter drunk driving to justify the widespread suspicionless seizures of innocent motorists. Thus, because DUI roadblocks are ineffective at both detection and deterrence, they fail to
adequately advance the public interest in preventing drunk driving.
However, even if the inefficiency of DUI roadblocks alone is not
enough to outweigh the public interest that they arguably advance,
74. Cf. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659 (acting upon observed traffic violations in order
to check for driver's license is a more effective and less intrusive alternative to suspicionless random stops). See also supra note 54.
75. See People v. Bartley, 109 Ill.2d 273, 287, 486 N.E.2d 880, 886 (1985). In
Bartley the court expressly noted that while the apprehension aspects of DUI roadblocks may not have been as good as other less intrusive methods, "common sense
alone" led to the conclusion that its deterrent potential was great. Id. The court relied on a National Transportation Safety Board Safety Study which pointed out that
the DUI roadblocks precluded drunk drivers from assuming they could escape detention by driving carefully. Id. (citing Report No. NTSB/SS-84/01, National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Study, Deterrence of Drunk Driving; the Role of Sobriety
Checkpoints and Administrative License Revocations). See also Note, Curbing the
Drunk Driver Under the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of Roadblock
Seizures, 71 GEo. L.J. 1457, 1471-72 (1983) (DUI roadblocks increase the perceived
risk of detection and therefore deter potential drunk drivers).
76. See Jacobs and Strossen, Mass Investigation Without Individualized Suspicion: A Constitutionaland Policy Critique of Drunk DrivingRoadblocks, 18 U.C.D.
L. REV. 595, 638-45 (1985) (authors review substantial amounts of available data and
assert that results are inconclusive).

77. H.L. Ross,
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17 at 102-04 (1982) cited in

Jacobs and Strossen, supra note 76, at 641 nn. 200 and 202.
78. Jacobs and Strossen, supra note 76, at 641 n. 202.
79. See Jacobs and Strossen, supra note 76 at 644 n.211 (citing Andaneas,
Drinking - and Driving - Laws in Scandanavia, SCANDANAVIAN STUD. IN L. 13, 21
(1984)).
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their intrusiveness tips the balance against their constitutionality.
C.

The Severity of the Intrusion on Motorists

The final factor to consider is the severity of the interference
with the individual's privacy.80 The Supreme Court has recognized
two types of intrusion. The first is "objective intrusion,"81 which is
the actual physical intrusion of the seizure. The second is "subjective intrusion," which is the intrusion the driver perceives."
At DUI roadblocks the objective intrusion is much greater than
in Brignoni-Ponce,3 Martinez-Fuerte," or Prouse.8 In each of
these three cases the objective intrusion was not personalized because it generally constituted a search for documents" and perhaps
brief questioning.8 7 In Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte, the
stops were made to check driving and automobile documents. Those
seizures were simply administrative inquiries' s and not criminal investigations. In contrast, the objective intrusion at DUI roadblocks
is highly personal. At DUI roadblocks the police closely examine the
driver's demeanor, coordination, eyes, speech, and breath." Al80. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
81. Objective intrusion is the stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspection which occurs at the checkpoint. It is the actual intrusion. See Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. at 558.
82. Id. Subjective intrusion is the concern, apprehension, or fright the person
stopped feels. It is the intrusion which is perceived. Id.
83. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (discussing Brignoni-Ponce).

84. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text (discussing Martinez-Fuerte and the application of the reasonableness balancing test).
85. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text (discussing Prouse and the application of the reasonableness balancing test).
86. In Brignoni-Poncethe detention was to ascertain whether the occupants of
the vehicle were legally within the United States. Brignoni-Ponce,422 U.S. at 874-75.
A showing of proper immigration documents would have sufficed to satisfy the officers. Id.
In Martinez-Fuerte, the scope of the checkpoint stop was the same as in
Brignoni-Ponce.Therefore, a showing of proper documents would suffice.
In Prouse, the stop was to ascertain whether the driver possessed a valid driver's
license and vehicle registration. Prouse, 440 U.S.at 650. Thus, all that was required
was that the driver show valid documents.
87. See Brignoni-Ponce,422 U.S. at 880 (all that is required is a brief response
to a question or two).
88. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), recognized a distinction
between administrative searches and searches for other purposes. There the searches
were made to discover building code violations - i.e., faulty wiring, poor plumbing and the Court concluded that for administrative searches no individualized suspicion
was needed. Id. For a comparison of administrative searches and DUI roadblocks, see
infra notes 107-22 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., People v. Bartley, 109 I11.
2d 273, 279, 486 N.E.2d 880, 883 (1985)
(defendant "fumbled" when producing driver's license, speech was slurred, had odor
of alcohol on breath); State v.Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1983)
(strong odor of alcohol on defendant's breath, eyes were bloodshot and watery); Little
v. State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903, 906 (1984) (defendant's face was flushed red,
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though the stop may be brief, the examination is highly personal
and intense. Moreover, the purpose of DUI roadblock stops is to discover evidence of a serious criminal offense." Such objective intrusiveness is significantly more substantial than in Martinez-Fuerte,
heretofore the only vehicle stop the Supreme Court has permitted
without requiring individualized suspicion." This is well illustrated
in United States v. Ortiz.92 In Ortiz, the Court confronted a vehicle
stop made at the same checkpoint involved in Martinez-Fuerte.Unlike Martinez-Fuerte,however, Ortiz concerned a search as well as a
stop." Noting the higher intrusiveness level of a search, the Ortiz
Court held that a search for illegal aliens occurring at the permanent checkpoint violated the fourth amendment. 4 The intense personal inspection police conduct at DUI roadblocks to search for
signs of DUI, render them much more like the searches disapproved
in Ortiz than the stops approved in Martinez-Fuerte.Moreover, besides being more objectively intrusive, DUI roadblocks are also more
subjectively intrusive.
Although the subjective intrusiveness of DUI roadblocks, where
all approaching motorists are detained, is less than that of the roving random stops in Brignoni-Ponce and Prouse, it is much more
than what was permissible in Martinez-Fuerte. In Martinez-Fuerte
the Court emphasized the permanence of the checkpoint and the
minimal level of subjective intrusion. 5 Because the checkpoint was
permanent and its location widely known, motorists were not surprised upon approaching it. 6 DUI roadblocks, however, are not per97
manent. In fact, they often change locations during a single night,
making them in effect "roving roadblocks." This characteristic
makes DUI roadblocks substantially similar to the roving stops held
to violate the fourth amendment in Brignoni-Ponce" and Prouse.9
Because of their temporary nature, DUI roadblocks instill the sureyes were glassy and bloodshot, strong odor of alcohol); State v. Coccomo, 177
N.J.Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131, 133 (N.J. Super Ct. 1980) (defendant's eyes were bloodshot, odor of alcohol on his breath); People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 12,
483 N.Y.S. 2d 649 (1984) (eyes watery and bloodshot, strong odor of alcohol, fumbled
with his wallet).
90. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (example of strict DUI statute).
91. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). In Martinez-Fuerte the objective intrusion was merely
the request for documents and/or the asking of one or two questions. It did not entail
the intense examination of the seized individual's person, as in DUI roadblock stops.
92. Id. at 558-59.
93. Id. at 559.
94. Id. at 895.
95. Id. at 558-59.
96. Id. at 559.
97. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 563 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (roadblocks were set for a period of time and then relocated).
98. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
99. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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prise, fear, and apprehension that the Court protected against in
Brignoni-Ponce and Prouse. DUI roadblocks are also more subjectively intrusive because once the initial stop is made, police have
substantial discretion in examining each driver.
At DUI roadblocks the police closely examine many of the
driver's physical characteristics to determine whether he or she is
intoxicated.100 This is quite unlike a stop where one is asked to produce immigration documents.10 1 Immigration documents are either
valid or they are not. The officer at an immigration checkpoint has
no discretion as to whether the documentation is in order. In contrast, the police at DUI roadblocks must rely on their subjective perceptions to determine whether a driver is under the influence. The
determination, therefore, is significantly more discretionary than determining whether one has his or her immigration documents. Moreover, at DUI roadblocks decisions regarding how long to detain a
particular driver, what questions to ask him or her, and the amount
of scrutiny applied to him or her, are decisions which naturally must
be left to the individual officer's discretion. This discretion, however,
renders DUI roadblocks similar to the stops struck down in
Brignoni-Ponce and Prouse.102 The stops in Brignoni-Ponce and
Prouse violated the fourth amendment because police had too much
discretion in making the stop.108 At DUI roadblocks, police have too
much discretion after making the stop.
In sum, the balancing analysis leads to the conclusion that suspicionless seizures at DUI roadblocks are unreasonable and, therefore, violate the fourth amendment. Although these roadblocks seek
to serve a strong and legitimate public interest, they do not adequately advance that interest. Moreover, DUI roadblocks are much
more intrusive than any police tactic the Supreme Court has sanctioned without requiring some quantum of individualized suspicion.
However, in certain unique circumstances the Court has permitted
limited police invasions of people's privacy without requiring indi100. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
Compare United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (holding the
stop of motorists at checkpoint, for purpose of checking immigration documents and
asking about citizenship status, without individualized suspicion valid) with United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (holding the search of car stopped at an immigration checkpoint in order to check for illegal aliens was unconstitutional). See supra
notes 92-94 (discussion of Ortiz).
102. Although in Brignoni-Ponceand Prouse the level of discretion was arguably higher than in roadblock stops where all motorists are seized, the level of discretion remaining with officers at DUI roadblock stops is substantially greater than in
Martinez-Fuerte.See supra notes 81-98 and accompanying text.
103. The stops in those cases were random roving stops. Prouse, 440 U.S. at
650-51; Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 875. Because the stops were made at random,
police could subjectively select which cars to stop.
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vidualized suspicion.' ° 4 The question then arises whether DUI roadblocks fall within any of these recognized exceptions.

II. DUI

ROADBLOCKS AND THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE INDIVIDUALIZED
SUSPICION REQUIREMENT

The United States Supreme Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence has traditionally required specific and particularized information in order for police to justify intrusions into people's privacy.' 0 5 Only a handful of narrow exceptions authorize intrusions
into people's privacy without some quantum of individualized suspicion.106 Two of these exceptions are particularly relevant to our present inquiry.'0 7 The two are: searches undertaken for administrative
purposes,'08 and stops occurring at permanent border patrol checkpoints.'09 Unless DUI roadblocks fall within one of these exceptions
they must be held to violate the fourth amendment.
A.

Administrative Searches

In Camara v. Municipal Court"0 the Court sanctioned searches
104. The Supreme Court has expressly recognized only four limited exceptions
to the individualized suspicion requirement. First, in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967) the Court carved out an exception for administrative searches. See
infra notes 107-22 and accompanying text. Second, the Court created an exception
for permanent immigration checkpoints. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976). See infra notes 123-48 and accompanying text.
In United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983), the Supreme Court
sanctioned the suspicionless search and seizure of a vessel in waters accessible to the
open sea. The Villamonte-Marquez Court, however, distinguished the search of a vessel accessible to the open sea from a vehicle on the highway. Id. at 588-89.
In INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984) the Supreme Court allowed INS
"surveys" of workplaces to ascertain if the workers were legally within the United
States. DUI roadblocks are readily distinguishable from the "surveys" in Delgado because the Court in Delgado held that there was no "seizure." Id. at 1763-65. The
Court held that, "unless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to
demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave"
there was no seizure. Id. at 1763. The Delgado Court concluded that although there
were INS officials blocking the exits to the building, the workers were not seized. Id.
See generally Note, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado: Factory
Raids: Seizure or Brief Encounter? 18 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 509 (1985) (author thoroughly discusses and criticizes the Court's failure to recognize that the encounters
constituted seizures).
Delgado is readily distinguishable from the DUI roadblock situation, because the
Supreme Court has consistently held that the stop of a vehicle for any duration is a
"seizure." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
105. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 n.18 (1968).
106. See supra note 104.
107. See supra note 104.
108. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See infra notes 107-22
and accompanying text.
109. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). See infra notes 12348 and accompanying text.
110. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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of buildings for safety code violations without requiring prior individualized suspicion. The Court employed the reasonableness test.
In performing the balancing analysis, the Court focused on three salient factors which strongly supported an exception to the individualized suspicion requirement.' These factors are of particular significance because DUI roadblocks must satisfy them in order to be
found to fall within the exception. First, the intrusion in Camara
had a long history of acceptance." 2 Second, the public demanded
that dangerous conditions be corrected. 18 Third, the intrusion was
not personal nor aimed at uncovering criminal activity."'
First, the Camara Court recognized that building code inspections had a "long history of judicial and public acceptance."". s DUI
roadblocks, however, are a very recent law enforcement development." 6 Being a recent development there is no history of judicial or
public acceptance. Thus, DUI roadblocks fail to meet the first
Camara factor.
Second, the Camara Court noted that the public interest demanded that dangerous conditions in buildings be prevented and
corrected." 7 In assessing this factor the Court emphasized that there
was no other alternative available which would achieve adequate results, because many building code violations could not be ascertained without a search of the building's interior. "'
As in Camara,the dangers DUI roadblocks seek to prevent are
significant." 9 The critical distinction, however, is that there are effective alternatives to DUI roadblocks that are much less intrusive. 12 0 DUI is an observable offense, unlike the building code violations in Camara that were absolutely unobservable without the
search. Thus, DUI can be detected without eliminating the individualized suspicion requirement.' 8 ' Police are trained to recognize specific characteristics drunk drivers display.' 2 Requiring some minimal level of individualized suspicion before a stop to investigate
111. Id. at 537.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See supra note 4.
117. Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 1 and 60-63 and accompanying text.
120. Police are trained to ascertain characteristics that intoxicated drivers display. See supra note 73. Because driving under the influence is an observable offense,
a less intrusive alternative to suspicionless seizures would be stops based on some
level of individualized suspicion. The level need not be great. Indeed anything greater
than the complete lack of suspicion would be less intrusive.
121. See supra notes 73 and 117.
122. See supra note 73.
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DUI can be justified is, therefore, a much less intrusive alternative
to the indiscriminate seizure of thousands of persons. Because driving under the influence can be detected without resort to suspicionless seizures, and because alternative detection methods exist,
the roadblocks fail to meet the second Camara factor.
Finally, in Camara, the Court rationalized that administrative
searches were not criminal nor personal in nature. 123 In contrast,
DUI roadblock examinations are personal in nature and have criminal implications.124 At DUI roadblocks police question and examine
each driver to discover whether he or she is driving under the influence. DUI is a serious criminal offense. 125 It is apparent, therefore,
that DUI roadblocks fail to satisfy the third Camara factor. In fact,
DUI roadblocks do not satisfy any of the Camara factors. Thus,
DUI roadblocks do not fall within the administrative search exception. The question remains whether DUI roadblocks fall within the
narrow exception the Supreme Court has carved out for permanent
immigration checkpoints.
B. Permanent Immigration Checkpoints
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,16 the United States Supreme Court permitted border patrol agents to stop all cars which
pass through permanent immigration checkpoints without requiring
individualized suspicion. 21 The Court's approval of these suspicionless seizures should be strictly limited to the context of border
searches. 2 Border searches have historically been subject to relaxed
123. Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
124. DUI roadblock investigations are of the "person." See supra notes 89-90
and accompanying text. See supra note 3 (example of a DUI statute and the severity
of the applicable criminal sanctions).
125. See supra note 3. However, the Camara Court recognized that in most
jurisdictions refusal to comply with a search request was itself a criminal offense.
Camara,387 U.S. at 531. The critical distinction was that searches in Camara were
aimed at securing compliance with minimum standards for buildings, not for gathering evidence of crimes. Id. at 535.
126. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
127. Id.
128. Border searches have historically been subject to relaxed fourth amendment scrutiny. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304
(1985); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983); United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977); Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
The uniqueness of the circumstances at the border justifies the relaxed scrutiny.
For example, the United States has a unique and compelling interest in national selfprotection and protecting the integrity of its borders. See United States v. Montoya
de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3312-13 (1985). Moreover, the individual has less of a
reasonable expectation of privacy at the border. See id. Compare United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985) (defendant's 27 hour detention at Los
Angeles International Airport to investigate whether she was smuggling narcotics
within her body, upheld on less than probable cause because she had arrived on an

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 19:983

fourth amendment scrutiny.2 9 In a series of cases 3 ' the Supreme
Court has created and expanded the border search exception.13' Because the influence of the border search exception in Martinez-Fuerte is strong, reliance upon the case in the DUI roadblock context
is misplaced. Many courts, failing to recognize this, have erroneously
32
relied on Martinez-Fuerte to sustain DUI roadblocks.
The Supreme Court has held that border searches need not
physically take place at the border.'33 In Almedia-Sanchez v.
United States,'3 4 the Court held that searches occurring at the
"functional equivalents" of the border are nevertheless border
searches. 8 5 The Almedia-Sanchez Court noted that searches occurring "at an established station near the border, at a point marking
the confluence of two or more roads that extend from the border,
might be functional equivalents of border searches."' 3'
Although the Court did not expressly label Martinez-Fuerte a
border search case, it is evident that border search concerns were
highly relevant to the Court's decision. 3 7 After discussing border
international flight and therefore was a border search) with Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491 (1983) (defendant's fifteen minute detention at Miami International Airport to
investigate drug smuggling held unconstitutional, defendant had arrived on a domestic flight). See generally Note, United States v. Montoya de Hernandez: Internal
Drug Smuggling at the Border: The Supreme Court Lets Nature Take its Course, 19
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 759 (1986) (discussion of relaxed fourth amendment scrutiny at
border).
129. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977). See also supra note 125.
In United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Court held that border searches
were not subject to usual fourth amendment constraints. The Court noted that the
first Congress, prior to proposing the Bill of Rights, had enacted the original Customs
Act, Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5 § 24, 1 Stat. 29, which authorized border searches.
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623. The Court reasoned, therefore, that such searches were not
subject to the strictures of the fourth amendment.
130. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. Ct. at 3304; Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 606; Carrol, 267 U.S. at 132; Boyd, 116 U.S. at 616 (1886).
131. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (Court
extends border searches to the functional equivalents of the border).
132. See supra note 11 and cases cited therein.
133. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272-73.
134. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
135. Id. at 273.
136. Id.
137. That the Martinez-FuerteCourt failed to expressly discuss border search
should not preclude the inference that border search concerns had a strong influence
on the Court's decision. In Almeida-Sanchez the Court had expressly stated that
searches occurring at established stations near the border, or at a point where two or
more roads from the border intersected would be considered border searches. 413
U.S. at 273. In Martinez-Fuerte the Court noted that the checkpoint was near the
intersection of two important roads leading from the border. 428 U.S. at 552. Thus, it
would seem that under the Alemida-Sanchez rationale the checkpoint stop would be
at the functional equivalent of the border and therefore be subject to relaxed fourth
amendment scrutiny at the outset.
Compare Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273 ("searches at an established station
near the border, at a point marking the confluence of two or more roads that extend
from the border") with Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 553 (checkpoint was close to the
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concerns the Martinez-FuerteCourt noted that the checkpoint was
"maintained at or near [an] intersection of important roads leading away from the border."'38 This language is virtually identical to
the language in Almedia-Sanchez which described "functional
equivalents" of the border. Unfortunately, this parallel has escaped
most courts looking to Martinez-Fuerte for guidance in DUI roadblock cases. Reading Martinez-Fuerte in its proper border search
context significantly distinguishes it from the DUI roadblock scenario because DUI roadblocks occur within the borders. As Chief Justice Taft recognized in Carroll v. United States,139 travelers may be
stopped upon crossing an international boundary, but "those lawfully within the country .. .have a right to passage without interruption or search unless there is ...probable cause for believing
that their vehicles are carrying contraband . .. "140 In addition to
the border search distinction, other features unique to border patrol
checkpoints distinguish them from DUI roadblocks.
Border patrol checkpoints are permanent.' The Martinez-Fuerte Court expressly stated that its holding was "confined to permanent checkpoints."' 4 The permanence of the checkpoint is significant because discretion at a permanent checkpoint is substantially
curtailed' 43 and the "subjective intrusion" that permanent checkpoints create is much less than that at temporary roving DUI roadblocks."' Motorists can become aware of a checkpoint operated at
the same place all the time. As a result, there is no element of surprise in the stop and drivers need not fear or be apprehensive upon
approaching the checkpoint. 49
Another significant distinction is that permanent immigration
checkpoints are similar to the administrative searches approved in
Camara v. Municipal Court.1 6 The purpose of searches conducted
at immigration checkpoints is to detect persons entering the United
States illegally and deport them. This is an administrative purpose,
not prosecutorial.'1 4 DUI roadblocks, however, are conducted to deconfluence of two or more roads leading away from the border).
138.

Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 552.

139. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
140. Id. at 154.
141.

Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 545.

142. Id. at 566 n.19.
143. Id. at 559.
144. Id. at 558-59 (motorists stopped at routine permanent checkpoint are not
taken by surprise for they know, or may obtain knowledge of, the checkpoint and its
location).
145. Id.
146. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
147. United States v. Alemida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. 266, 278 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
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tect criminal conduct.14 8 In light of these salient distinctions, DUI
roadblocks do not fall within the narrow fourth amendment exception carved out for suspicionless searches and seizures at permanent
immigration checkpoints. Many lower courts, however, have used
another tactic to uphold DUI roadblocks in the face of fourth
amendment challenges. These courts have relied upon dictum in
Delaware v. Prouse to create yet another exception to the individualized suspicion requirement."4 9
III. DUI ROADBLOCKS AND THE Prouse DICTUM
Rather than focus on the holding of Delaware v. Prouse, many
courts have, instead, clasped onto dictum that the Prouse Court
used to limit its holding. 150 The Prouse Court stated that although
random suspicionless stops to check for drivers' licenses and vehicle
registrations violated the fourth amendment, less intrusive means
were available to the state."8" One possible alternative the Court
suggested was a roadblock where all approaching vehicles would be
stopped. 52 The Court proffered this suggestion merely to illustrate a
less intrusive alternative, not to provide a necessarily constitutional
one. Moreover, it is important to note that the purpose of the stop
in Prouse was to check the driver's license and vehicle registration.
Stops of this nature are much less intrusive than stops to investigate
DUI. "3 Additionally, the Court has not yet closely scrutinized the
constitutionality of roadblocks set up to check drivers' licenses and
vehicle registrations.' It is highly speculative indeed to conclude
148. Illinois, for example, provides a penalty of not more than one year in
prison for a DUI conviction. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 /2 par. 11-501 (1985).
149. See, e.g., State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143 (Me. 1985); Little v. State, 330
Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984).
150. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). The Prouse Court stated:
This holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or other States from
developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming
traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative.
Id. (footnote omitted).
151. Id. at 660-63.
152. Id. at 663.
153. A stop made for purposes of checking the operator's license is closely analogous to a stop made for purposes of checking the occupant's immigration papers, as
in Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). Both seek documents and do not seek to
closely examine the occupant's person, See supra note 86.
154. In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (plurality opinion), the Supreme
Court approved a stop of a vehicle at a driver's license checkpoint without elaborating upon the subject. Id. at 739. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, cryptically wrote, "the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that it did not 'question ... the
validity of the officer's initial stop of appellant's vehicle as a part of a license check,'
....
We agree." Id. Justice Rehnquist then cited to Prouse at 654-55. Justice Rehnquist, however, had dissented in Prouse because he did not believe that even suspicionless random stops to check for driver's licenses violated the Constitution. Prouse,
440 U.S. at 666-67.

19861

DUI Roadblocks

from the Prouse Court's dictum that the Court would sanction DUI

roadblocks.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Court would conclude that
driver license/vehicle registration roadblocks pass constitutional
muster, this conclusion would not support the constitutionality of
DUI roadblocks. The purpose of roadblocks conducted to check
drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations is very similar to the purpose of the searches that the Court approved in Camara," and the
stops it approved in Martinez-Fuerte. " The purpose is administrative in nature. Checking for driver's licenses is similar to checking
for immigration documents. Unlike DUI roadblock stops, these stops
are not made primarily for the purpose of detecting criminal activity. Concluding that the Court has sanctioned DUI roadblocks because of the dictum in Prouse is to ignore the significant factual differences between the two situations.
Moreover, inferring from the Prouse dictum that the Court
would sanction suspicionless roadblocks as long as all drivers are
stopped, is not only speculative but it could have very serious implications. Justice Feldman of the Arizona Supreme Court voiced a
grave concern in State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court,'57 when he
stated that if suspicionless stops of persons at DUI roadblocks could
pass constitutional muster, then presumably, suspicionless stops to
detect other crimes such as narcotics possession or burglary would
be constitutional. 158 Unfortunately, a New York Court has already
155. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See supra notes 107-22 and accompanying text.
156. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). See supra notes 123-49 and accompanying text.
157. 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992, 997 (1983) (Feldman, J., specially concurring).
158. Id. Justice Feldman wrote:
The issue here, therefore, is whether the fourth amendment permits officers to
stop and question persons whose conduct is innocent, unremarkable, and free
from suspicion.
The question has frightening implications. The thought that an American
can be compelled to "show his papers" before exercising the right to walk the
streets, drive the highways or board the trains is repugnant to American institutions and ideals. If roadblocks can be maintained to stop all persons, regardless of their conduct, for the purpose of investigating or apprehending drunk
drivers, then presumably similar stops of all citizens could be undertaken for
questioning and surveillance with regard to other crimes . . . . It might be argued that if the law did permit such stops, we would have less crime. Nevertheless, our system is based on the idea that the risk of criminal activity is less
of a danger than the risk of unfettered interference with personal liberty. The
concept was succinctly expressed by a newspaper columnist who recently used
these words in describing his opposition to roadblock stops for apprehension of
drunk drivers:
I . . . have often thought that getting killed by some intoxicated idiot
who crossed the median divider and hit me head-on would be the worst
and most senseless way to die. I mourn for the parents of children who
have died at the hands of drunk drivers. But none of this makes a police
state acceptable. Freedom doesn't come risk-free. I'm willing to take
risks in exchange for my freedom.
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done precisely what Justice Feldman feared.
In People v. John BB,1 59 the New York Court of Appeals, relying on the Prouse dictum, sanctioned a roving stop of a vehicle to
investigate a series of recent burglaries. 60 The court characterized
the stop as a "roving roadblock" stop and concluded that because it
was conducted in a uniform and non-discriminatory manner, the officers did not need any individualized suspicion. 6 ' The result in
John BB is a clear sign of the dangerousness of inferring too much
from the dictum in Prouse. The Prouse dictum should be limited to
the facts of that case. Put another way, the most that can be logically inferred from the Prouse dictum is that a roadblock carried out
solely to check drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations, where all
cars approaching are stopped, is less offensive to the fourth amendment than the particular stop in Prouse. To infer more than this is
to engage in highly dangerous speculation.
CONCLUSION

The constitutionality of the suspicionless seizures occurring at
DUI roadblocks is seriously suspect. In light of the historical prohibition against suspicionless seizures, DUI roadblocks have a difficult
burden to overcome and must be given exacting constitutional scrutiny. DUI roadblocks subject thousands of innocent drivers, whose
conduct raises absolutely no suspicion, to seizure, questioning, and
close personal examination. These examinations are undertaken to
uncover evidence of a serious criminal offense and thus are quite
unlike administrative searches. 68 Moreover, the temporary nature of
DUI roadblocks render them substantially similar to the roving patrol stops that the United States Supreme Court has traditionally
struck down.1 68
Although police discretion at DUI roadblocks may be proscribed, too much discretion remains to allow suspicionless interference with thousands of legitimate travelers. DUI roadblocks are too
intrusive on the legitimate traveler's privacy and do not adequately
advance the public interest. Less intrusive alternatives are available
to advance the strong public interest.
In short, seizures occurring at DUI roadblocks are essentially
Id. (quoting Rooney, Roadblocks for Drunk Drivers Nibble Away at Our Freedoms,
Chicago Tribune, reprinted in The Arizona Republic, April 4, 1983, A, at 7).
159. 56 N.Y.2d 482, 438 N.E.2d 864, 453 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1982).
160. Id. at 485, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 160, 438 N.E.2d at 865.
161. Id. at 488-89, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 162, 438 N.E.2d at 867.
162. See supra notes 107-22 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973).
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searches of the person of every driver detained. As such, they cannot
be maintained in harmony with the fourth amendment as long as
drivers that raise absolutely no suspicion whatever are seized. The
Court must not permit drunk drivers from making the fourth
amendment their latest casualty.
Lazaro Fernandez

